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I wish to reaffirm a simple message: European and other non-U.S. market players are
welcome and encouraged to participate in the U.S. markets. The SEC has facilitated
foreign participation in the past and will continue to do so, all within the framework of
protecting investors through our existing securities regulation. 1

The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has long adhered to a
policy of promoting foreign participation in U.S. securities markets while maintaining sufficient regulatory standards to ensure the protection of U.S. investors.2
In practice, however, these dual goals are often in conflict, as over-regulation
may cause foreign market participants to exit the domestic marketplace.3 In the
wake of the Enron collapse and the accounting scandals of 2001, there has been
increasing fear that the SEC will begin to regulate foreign participation in U.S.
markets more stringently.4 While the SEC itself has reaffirmed its commitment
to these dual policy concerns,5 one federal district court has recently chosen to
disregard this balancing act, inappropriately favoring domestic investors over
foreign market participants.
In Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware considered whether Daimler-Benz AG, as a
German domestic corporation, was entitled to an exemption from liability imposed under U.S. securities laws.6 Securities law generally prohibits issuers of
publicly traded stock in the United States from printing materially misleading
statements in their proxy materials,7 but provides exemptions from these requirements for certain corporations meeting the definition of “foreign private issuers.”8
In Tracinda, plaintiff Tracinda Corporation challenged the 1998 merger of
Chrysler Corporation with Daimler, alleging common law fraud and violations
of various securities laws related to purported oral and written misrepresentations made by the corporation and its officers.9 The court held that Daimler,
while technically meeting the definition of a “foreign private issuer,” was not
1.

Roel C. Campos, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Embracing International Business in the PostEnron Era, Address Before the Centre for European Policy Studies (June 11, 2003), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch061103rcc.htm.

2.

Anupama J. Naidu, Was its Bite Worse than its Bark? The Costs Sarbanes-Oxley Imposes on German Issuers May Translate into Costs to the United States, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 271, 272
(2004).

3.

Id.

4.

See Campos, supra note 1. Commissioner Campos, who is addressing European industry leaders, notes
that “[t]he title of my speech, ‘Embracing International Business in the Post-Enron World,’ was chosen
deliberately. Indeed, I believe that the Commission’s history has been, and continues to be, one of welcoming a diversity of participants to the U.S. markets.” Id.

5.

See id.

6.

364 F. Supp. 2d 362, 394–95 (D.Del. 2005).

7.

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2005). Proxy materials include both the “form of proxy” through which registered
shareholders vote their shares, as well as the accompanying prospectus containing corporate financial
statements and officer and director discussion of key corporate policies and events. Id.

8.

17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (2005).

9.

Tracinda, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 365, 395–416.
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permitted to benefit from the exemption specifically designed for such parties.10
The court’s ruling narrowed the exemption for foreign corporations and is contrary to the broad interpretation of the exemption found by the Ninth Circuit in
Batchelder v. Kawamoto 11 and the Southern District of New York in In re
Vivendi Universal, S.A. 12 This case comment contends that while the court correctly held that defendant Daimler did not violate U.S. securities laws,13 it erroneously failed to recognize that Daimler was a “foreign private issuer,” and thus
exempt from the laws entirely.
Tracinda, a corporation organized for the purposes of investing in publicly
traded entities, was a major shareholder of Chrysler common stock prior to
Chrysler’s merger with Daimler.14 Through a series of negotiations with
Chrysler management in the years prior to the merger, Tracinda obtained the
right to elect a representative to the board of directors.15 When members of the
board began preliminary talks in February and March of 1998 concerning the
possibility of a business combination with Daimler, the management of Tracinda
initially supported the proposal.16 When the potential business combination was
presented to Chrysler’s shareholders for a vote, the prospectus disclosed that both
Daimler and Chrysler were to have equal representation on the board of the
newly merged entity DaimlerChrysler AG.17 The prospectus repeatedly described
the business combination as a “merger of equals.”18
The shareholders approved the merger on September 18, 1998, and the new
corporation instituted the governance structure as described in the prospectus.19
However, on October 1, 1999, DaimlerChrysler issued a press release stating
that the board would be reduced in size, with all the positions lost to be those of
former Chrysler directors, including Tracinda’s representative.20 In an interview with the London Financial Times, Juergen Schrempp, Chairman of the
DaimlerChrysler Board and former Chairman of the Daimler Board, admitted
that the current management structure was one that he had always intended.21
10. Id. at 394–95.
11. 147 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1998).
12. 381 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
13. Tracinda, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 406–12.
14. Id. at 367.
15. Id. at 369.
16. Id. at 371.
17. Id. at 377–78.
18. Id. at 378–79.
19. Id. at 380–81.
20. See id. at 383.
21. Id. at 387.
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In effect, he claimed he had never intended the business combination to be a
“merger of equals,” but rather a Daimler acquisition of Chrysler.22
On November 27, 2000, Tracinda sued DaimlerChrysler, Daimler, and
three current DaimlerChrysler Board members in the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware.23 The complaint alleged a series of violations
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, including Section 14(a) and Rule
14a-9 promulgated thereunder for material misrepresentations on the defendant’s
proxy statement. On April 7, 2005, the court granted DaimlerChrysler’s motion
for summary judgment, and dismissed all of Tracinda’s claims, holding that
Tracinda failed to establish the elements of its claims for common law fraud and
securities laws violations.24 Even though the court ruled that Daimler did not
violate the Exchange Act or any rules promulgated thereunder, the court nevertheless held that it was subject to the Act’s regulations and not entitled to any
exemption.25
Under the Exchange Act, Congress granted the SEC the authority to directly
regulate issuers of securities in the United States.26 Pursuant to its legislative
mandate, the SEC promulgated Rule 14a-9 requiring proxy statements (or any
form of communication accompanying a proxy) to be free of material misrepresentations or omissions of fact.27 The SEC did, however, create an exemption to
Rule 14a-9 under Rule 3a12-3(b), which states that “[s]ecurities registered by a
foreign private issuer28 shall be exempt from [the proxy rules] . . . of the [Exchange] Act.”29
22. Id.
23. Id. at 365.
24. Id. at 417.
25. Id. at 394–95.
26. In the case of proxy regulation, section 14(a) of the Exchange Act broadly grants the SEC power over the

regulation of proxy solicitations stating, “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors, to solicit . . . any proxy . . . registered pursuant to section 12 of this title.” 15
U.S.C.A. § 78n (2005).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2005).
28. Rule 3a12-3 references Rule 3b-4 for the definition of a “foreign private issuer.” Rule 3b-4, 17 C.F.R.

§ 240.3b-4(c) (2005), details the requirements for classification as a “foreign private issuer.” According to
the regulation:
The term foreign private issuer means any foreign issuer other than a foreign government except
an issuer meeting the following conditions:
(1) More than 50 percent of the issuer’s outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly
held of record by residents of the United States; and
(2) Any of the following:
(i) The majority of the executive officers or directors are United States citizens or residents;
(ii) More than 50 percent of the assets of the issuer are located in the United States; or
(iii) The business of the issuer is administered principally in the United States.
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (2005).
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In reaching its decision that Daimler was not exempt from Rule 14a-9 of
the Exchange Act, the Tracinda court performed a purely textual analysis of the
rules, disregarding previous decisions which held for a much broader interpretation of the foreign private issuer exemption.30 The court did not dispute
Daimler’s contention that it met the definition of a “foreign private issuer,”31 but
despite this acknowledgment held that under a “plain language” reading of Rule
3a12-3(b), the exemption only applied to securities registered 32 by a foreign private issuer, and not to foreign private issuers generally.33 The court held that
because the proxy materials in question were sent to shareholders of pre-merger
Chrysler common stock, which was registered by Chrysler and not Daimler, the
foreign private issuer exemption did not apply.34 Under this approach, the court
incorrectly narrowed the existing view of Rule 3a12-3(b) as presented in Batchelder 35 and Vivendi,36 wherein the courts ruled broadly to exempt all “foreign
private issuers” from Rule 14a-9, regardless of who registered the securities.37
The Tracinda court acknowledged the precedential value of these rulings but
failed to properly distinguish its case from either.38
In Batchelder, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ruled that Honda Motor Company, a Japanese corporation, was exempt from
Rule 14a-9 under the foreign private issuer exemption simply because it met the
definition of a foreign private issuer.39 Batchelder, a holder of Honda American
depository receipts (“ADRs”),40 claimed that Honda had distributed proxy statements that were materially misleading with respect to the qualifications of nomi30. See Tracinda, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
31. Id.
32. Registration is the process of filing a registration form and prospectus with the SEC. The SEC requires

that the filings include a description of the corporation’s business, a description of the securities being
offered for sale, information regarding the corporations management, and certified financial statements.
Unless the corporation qualifies for an exemption, no securities may be offered to potential investors until
the registration statements are approved by SEC staff. J EFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS
LAW AND POLICY 297 (5th ed. 2003).
33. Tracinda, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
34. Id.
35. Batchelder v. Kawamoto, 147 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1998).
36. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., 381 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
37. See Batchelder, 147 F.3d at 922–23; Vivendi, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 171.
38. Tracinda, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
39. Batchelder, 147 F.3d at 922–23.
40. ADRs are investments in foreign securities indirectly through a U.S. institution, termed a depository.

The depository, usually a bank or trust company, purchases and holds shares of the securities in the foreign
country. The depository then issues to U.S. purchasers a negotiable instrument called an ADR which
represents shares in the depository’s foreign holdings. While the holders of ADRs only indirectly hold the
common stock of the foreign corporation, they are still entitled to all the benefits of being a shareholder
including receiving voting rights through proxies. HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS POLICY AND REGULATION 81 (12th ed. 2005).
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nated directors.41 The Batchelder court held that as long as a foreign
corporation met the definition of a foreign private issuer, the exemption would
apply. The court reiterated the breadth of their ruling, stating that “Rule 3a123(b) is clear with regard to [Honda’s] obligations under . . . [the proxy section of]
the Exchange Act and the rules promulgated thereunder — it has none.”42
The Tracinda court agreed with the holding in Batchelder, but attempted
to distinguish its case on a factual basis. The court noted that the securities in
Batchelder were Honda ADRs which were registered by Honda, the foreign
private issuer, whereas the securities in Tracinda were Chrysler common shares
registered by the domestic corporation.43 While this distinction is factually accurate, it is immaterial. The Batchelder court placed no emphasis on who registered the securities at issue; rather, the court focused solely on whether the
defendant met the definition of a foreign private issuer under Rule 3a12-3(b).44
If a defendant met this definition, as Honda did, it would be exempt without
further inquiry. In Tracinda, the plaintiff conceded that Daimler met the definition of a foreign private issuer, but the court held that simply meeting the
definition was not sufficient to be entitled to the exemption.45 Thus, by failing to
apply the exemption to Daimler, the court refused to follow the broad Batchelder
standard and instead favored a much narrower interpretation.
The Tracinda court likewise failed to follow the broad interpretation of the
foreign private issuer exemption rendered by the court in Vivendi, a case factually similar to Tracinda. In Vivendi, shareholders of Seagram Company, Ltd.,
a U.S. domestic corporation, received a proxy statement in anticipation of the
merger between Seagram, Vivendi Universal, S.A., and Canal Plus, S.A.46
Shareholders of Seagram common stock filed suit alleging that the proxy statement sent by Seagram and Vivendi contained material misrepresentations in direct violation of Rule 14a-9 of the Exchange Act.47 The court found that Vivendi
was a corporation organized under French law, and therefore “undisputedly” met
the definition of a foreign private issuer.48 Utilizing the broad rule of Batchelder, the Vivendi court held that, “because Vivendi is a foreign private issuer,
plaintiff’s [proxy rule] claim against Vivendi must be dismissed.”49
41. Batchelder, 147 F.3d at 922.
42. Id. at 923.
43. Tracinda, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
44. See Batchelder, 147 F.3d at 923 (noting that “Batchelder has failed to put forth any argument as to why

Honda . . . should not be considered a ‘foreign private issuer’ under Rule 3b-4(c)”).
45. See Tracinda, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
46. Vivendi, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 164.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 171.
49. Id.

424

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\51-2\NLR201.txt

unknown

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

Seq: 9

8-MAR-07

8:50

VOLUME 51  2006/07

The Tracinda court made no attempt to distinguish its case from Vivendi.
The court instead attacked the analysis performed in Vivendi, noting that “[i]n
Vivendi, the court did not analyze this question in detail and held that Vivendi
was organized under French law and therefore a ‘foreign private issuer.’ ”50 In
summarily dismissing the examination performed in Vivendi, the Tracinda
court failed to recognize that the Batchelder rule does not require a detailed
analysis. If a corporation meets the definition of a foreign private issuer, it is
simply exempt, with no further analysis necessary.
The holdings of Batchelder and Vivendi cannot be reconciled with
Tracinda. Batchelder and Vivendi held that all issuers meeting the statutory
definition of a foreign private issuer were exempt from federal proxy rules. In
contrast, the Tracinda court endorsed a more narrow exemption, requiring corporations to meet the definition of a foreign private issuer and to have also registered the subject shares.51 The question remains, however, as to whether the
Tracinda court had good reason to narrow the exemption.
The Tracinda court’s strict textual analysis fails to recognize the purposes of
the SEC in drafting the foreign issuer exemption. While the text of the exemption indicates that “securities registered by a foreign private issuer . . . shall be
exempt . . .,” textual interpretation should not be the absolute end of the analysis.52 The SEC drafted the federal proxy rules and their exemptions and therefore, it is to this agency’s purpose and communications with the public that one
must look for the “drafter’s intent.”53 The SEC is widely recognized for its primary mission of protecting the interests of U.S. investors.54 As a result, one
50. Id.
51. See Tracinda, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
52. Legal scholars and Justices alike have continually recognized that textual analysis has its limitations,

particularly when society has changed since the drafting of a statute, but the text has not. For example,
see ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 15 (3d ed. 2000) (1960), in which
McCloskey discusses how the actual text of the Constitution has remained constant since ratification, but
its meaning has continually altered:
The Constitution means whatever the circumstances of the future will allow it to mean. But since
those circumstances were almost sure to vary, the result was that alterability became the law of
the Constitution’s being: it might mean one thing in 1855, something else in 1905, and something
different in 1955, depending on what circumstances, including popular expectations, warranted.
See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring),
where Justice Jackson downplayed the importance of text with regard to interpretation of the Constitution. He stated that “[t]he actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to
judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn
from context.”
53. Generally courts will look to the congressional record, including floor debates and committee notes, in order

to determine legislative intent. Rules promulgated by the SEC, however, are not subject to the standard
legislative process and thus traditional sources for deriving legislative intent are not available.
54. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976), where the Court describes the Exchange Act,

which the SEC was created to enforce, as being “intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter
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might argue that all exemptions from rules intended to protect investors should be
interpreted narrowly, so as to best serve the SEC’s mission. However, the SEC
admits that it has an important, often unstated, secondary mission of fostering
the growth of the U.S. capital markets and investor wealth.55 These two goals
are often in conflict because regulations designed to benefit investors necessarily
place some burden on corporate freedom.56 While corporations are willing to accept some level of regulation in exchange for the vast benefits of access to U.S.
capital markets, regulations that are unduly burdensome may lead to corporate
flight to jurisdictions with less stringent regulatory schemes.57 With respect to
foreign corporations, the SEC is faced with the inherent conflict between maximizing investor protection from the potential abuses of foreign corporations and
maximizing investor access to foreign markets.58 Increasing the disclosure requirements for foreign corporations allows the SEC to protect U.S. investors, but
also limits their investment opportunities, as these requirements discourage foreign corporations from seeking access to U.S. capital markets.59
As result, the “legislative intent” of the SEC’s rules with respect to foreign
issuers is clearly one of balancing competing policy goals.60 Therefore, the most
appropriate interpretation of the foreign private issuer exemption is one that
reflects this duality. The narrow interpretation of Tracinda serves one of the
policy goals, providing the maximum level of protection for U.S. investors.
However, the holding effectively removes the exemption from any foreign issuer
that seeks to merge with a publicly traded U.S. corporation, as such a merger will
generally require a proxy vote by the shareholders of the domestic corporation.
Without the exemption, the foreign corporation will face liability for any inaccumarkets, and to impose regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national
securities exchanges.”
55. Integrated Disclosure System for Foreign Private Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 677, Exchange Act

Release No. 6360, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 18,274, 24 SEC Docket 3 (Nov. 20, 1981). In this
press release, the SEC discusses how the rules affecting foreign private issuers were created to balance
these competing interests. The press release states that
the Commission must evaluate two competing policies. One is the recognition that the investing
public in the United States needs the same type of basic information disclosed for an investment
decision regardless of whether the issuer is foreign or domestic. This view suggests that foreign
registrants be subject to exactly the same requirements as domestic ones. The other is that the
interests of the public are served by an opportunity to invest in a variety of securities, including
foreign securities. An implication of this policy is that the imposition on foreign issuers of the
same disclosure standards applicable to domestic issuers could discourage offerings of foreign securities in the United States, thereby depriving United States investors of the opportunity to invest
in foreign securities.
56. Id.
57. See generally id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
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rate information in the accompanying prospectus.61 While this may have some
positive effect by increasing shareholder protection, the negative effects on the
competing goal of increasing investor access to foreign markets would be devastating. In the context of a merger, shareholders who are entitled to vote on the
transaction will generally receive a prospectus that contains information on both
corporations. To protect themselves from liability, foreign acquirers may be required to ensure the accuracy of not only their statements but also the statements
of the target corporation. The time and due diligence required to ensure this
accuracy is costly,62 and even if all precautions are taken, the foreign corporation
may still be found liable.63 Such costs and potential for liability will greatly
diminish the attractiveness of U.S. corporations as merger targets, thus limiting
U.S. investor’s potential for maximum growth and access to foreign
corporations.64
Alternatively, the broad holdings of Batchelder and Vivendi preserve the
attractiveness of U.S. corporations as merger targets, without sacrificing the goal
of shareholder protection. Foreign corporations would receive protection from
suits related to misstatements on merger proxies, thus enticing greater foreign
investment in U.S. corporations. Furthermore, shareholders of the domestic target corporation who are harmed by misleading proxy statements would not be left
without remedy. The domestic corporation, as joint issuer of the offending proxy
statements would continue to be liable to its shareholders under the federal proxy
regulations.65
The ideal of balancing the dual policy goals of investor protection and the
growth of foreign participation in U.S. securities markets is not revolutionary,
but neither is it widely recognized. In a generation of corporate scandals it is
easy to push investor protection to the forefront at the expense of competing interests — and cases such as Tracinda exemplify the dangers of this phenomenon.
Longstanding traditions should not be ignored simply because current events indicate a weakness in effective regulation. Instead, “reaffirmations” must be made
61. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2005).
62. See Naidu, supra note 2, at 302–14 (discussing the costs that German issuers face when they choose to

cross-list their securities on an American exchange).
63. As drafted, section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act does not require the issuer to knowingly issue

a materially misleading proxy statement. By its simple terms, any person who solicits, or permits the use
of his name to solicit, any proxy in contravention of the rules promulgated by the SEC has acted
“unlawfully.”
64. See Naidu, supra note 2, at 315 (discussing generally that the additional costs associated with over-

regulation in the United States may discourage some German issuers from seeking out the U.S. capital
markets). While the author does not specifically discuss how over-regulation will affect mergers between
U.S. and foreign corporations, it is implicit that any transaction which leads to additional costs due to
regulation, such as a merger, will be viewed as less attractive to a foreign acquirer. See id.
65. Client Memorandum, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, Public Communications in the

Context of a Merger Transaction ¶ 8 (Oct. 1, 2001), available at http://www.ffhsj.com/cmemos/
100101.htm#_ednref35.
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in order to calm fears and reassure those affected that the status quo will be
maintained. Commissioner Campos’ reminder was a good one, but was perhaps
spoken too softly.
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